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1ARTICLE XX:  ENTRY INTO FORCE
by Graham S. Pearson*  & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles in the draft
Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and are unlikely
to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the end-game.   It
is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation Papers which will
consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the Protocol."   This Evaluation
Paper continues this series by considering Article XX Entry into Force  on which the AHG
has made good progress with the current rolling text containing two alternative forms of
language with two pairs of square brackets within one alternative.
Article XX
3.   In the April 1999 draft Protocol2, the text for Article XX contained, within square
brackets, a single form of language:
ARTICLE XX
ENTRY INTO FORCE
[1. This Protocol shall enter into force ... days after the date of the deposit of the ...th
instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than ... years after its opening for
signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the [30]th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]
                                                
* Graham S. Pearson is a Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the
University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7  1DP, UK.
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at
the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A
2AE, UK.
1Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol:  An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc
2United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/45, 14 April 1999, Geneva.
24.   In July 1999, the text for Article XX was developed3 into its current form which contains
two alternatives:
ARTICLE XX
ENTRY INTO FORCE
[[1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
50th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than two years after its opening for
signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the 30th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]
OR
[1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by [45][75] States, including the Governments of the Depositaries of the
Convention, but not earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the 30th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]]
5.  The strikethrough version of Article XXII provided4 by the FOC on Legal Issues for
further consideration is essentially identical to that in the draft Protocol.  It has, however,
been presented in such a way as to show that paragraph 2 is not in contention as this is
present in both options in the draft Protocol text..  Although bold text has been used in the
FOC strikethrough  text, this is in error as there are effectively no changes, apart from 'two'
becoming '2' in paragraph 1:
 ARTICLE XX
ENTRY INTO FORCE
[[1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
50th instrument of ratification, but in no case not earlier than 2 years after its
opening for signature.
                                                
3United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part I), 30 July 1999, Geneva.
4United Nations, Proposals for further consideration by the Friend of the Chair on Legal Issues, BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/FOC/22, 28 July 1999 in Annex IV of Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/46 (Part II), 4 August 1999,
Geneva.
3OR
[1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by [45][75] States, including the Governments of the Depositaries of the
Convention, but not earlier than 2 years after its opening for signature.]
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the 30th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]
Evaluation
6.     It is useful to compare the Protocol Article XX language with that relating to entry into
force in the  BTWC as well as that in more recent conventions and treaties such as that in the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT).
7.   Article XIV of the BTWC5 which opened for signature in 1972 includes in a single
Article provisions for signature, ratification, accession and the depositaries as well as for
entry into force.   The paragraphs relating to entry into force state:
3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by twenty-two governments, including the Governments designated as
Depositaries of the Convention.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of
deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.
 8.   The later language of the CWC6 which opened for signature in 1993 contains a single
Article XXI addressing Entry into Force:
ARTICLE XXI
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening
for signature.
                                                
5United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
6Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Available on the web at
http://www.opcw.nl
42. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Convention it shall enter into force on the 30th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.
9.  The CTBT7 which opened for signature in 1996 addresses Entry into Force in Article XIV:
ARTICLE XIV
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case
earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
2.   If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the
anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference
of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the
request of a majority of those States.   That Conference shall examine the extent to
which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and
decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry
into force of this Treaty.
3.   Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other
such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the
opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.
4.   All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in
paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as
observers.
5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following
the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
Annex 2 to the Treaty provides a List of States Pursuant to Article XIV  which is a list of the
44 States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally
participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and which
appear in Table 1 of either the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of
"Nuclear Power Reactors in the World" or the IAEA's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear
Research Reactors in the World".
10.  Finally, the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines8 which opened for signature in
December 1997 addresses Entry into Force in Article 17:
                                                
7Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
8Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997.  Available on the web at http://www.mines.gc.ca/english/documents/
treaty.html
5Article 17
Entry into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the
month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention  shall enter into force on the first
day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
11.   These different requirements for entry into force can be summarised as follows:
Legal Instrument Draft BTWC
Protocol
BTWC CWC CTBT Anti-
personnel
mines
 Ratifications for
entry into force
Option A:  50
Option B: 45 or
75 (inc BTWC
Depositaries)
22
(inc Depositaries)
65 44 listed
States
40
12.   There are two specific elements that need to be addressed.   First, the number of
instruments of ratification that need to be deposited for entry into force, and second, whether
this number should include the three Depositaries of the BTWC.
13.  The number of instruments of ratification that need to be deposited for entry into
force.   The argument that is usually involved in such considerations relates to the
achievement of a reasonable number of States Parties as a starting point along the road
towards universality.   When, however, a Protocol to an existing Convention is being
considered, as is the case with the BTWC Protocol, there is a different argument in that
because the basic prohibition is already in place, the incentive is to bring the new Protocol
and the organization to implement the Protocol into operation with its full authority as
quickly as possible so that the benefits of the new Protocol can be realised.   As we point out
in our Evaluation Paper on Article XXII Depositary/ies 9 the BTWC Organization will have a
major role to play in recruitment of States Parties to the Protocol and the promotion of
universality.  Consequently, the number of States Parties required to ratify prior to entry into
force should be kept low.   If the CWC information in the next paragraph is taken as the
model, it can be seen that 2 years after opening for signature 20 States had ratified the CWC.
Consequently, to achieve entry into force and the bringing of the new Organization into
operation with its full authority at an early date soon after 2 years after opening for signature,
                                                
9Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXII:  Depositary/ies, Evaluation Paper No. 7, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
6a realistic number of States required to have deposited their instruments of ratification would
be 20.
14.   The experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
established to implement the CWC is also informative.   An examination of the numbers of
States which ratified the CWC as a function of time shows that 2 years after opening for
signature the number of instruments deposited had reached 20 and that after 3 years that
number had risen to 47.   It was over 4 years after opening for signature that the CWC entered
into force and when it did, on 29 April 1997, 80 States had deposited their instruments of
ratification.
Ratifications of the CWC10
(Opened for signature on 11 - 13 January 1993.    Entered into force on 29 April 1997
180 days after deposit of 65th instrument on 31 October 1996)
Time after opening
for signature
6
months
12
months
18
months
24
months
30
months
36
months
42
months
48
months
54
months
No of State Parties 4 4 9 20 31 47 57 67 97
15.  There are a further two points that arise from the OPCW experience.  First, that the
staffing of the Organization takes a finite period of time -- and cannot be established prior to
entry into force as its membership will be drawn from the nationals of the States Parties --
and second, the time lines specified in the Convention dictated what work the OPCW had to
carry out in its first few months after entry into force.   It has also become clear that the
inability of States Parties to meet their obligations under the Convention on time has been
beneficial to the OPCW which has been able to grow its capabilities in time to meet the
demands placed on the Organization.    Consequently, there is an argument that a small
Organization to implement the BTWC Protocol will be able to function more effectively if
the number of instruments of ratification required to be deposited for entry into force to occur
is kept small as the Organization can then keep pace with the implementation of the Protocol
as the number of States Parties increases over time.
16.  Assessment.   For the Protocol to the BTWC, there are clear advantages from an early
entry into force and the bringing of the new Organization into operation with its full authority
at an early date and consequently a requirement for the deposit of a smaller number than 75
or even 65 instruments of ratification is favoured.   The CWC experience shows that for entry
into force and the bringing of the new Organization into operation with its full authority in 2
years, a number of 20 would be appropriate.
17.  The inclusion of the Depositaries of the BTWC.   The argument for the specific
inclusion or exclusion of a requirement for the three Depositaries of the BTWC, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, to have deposited their instruments of
ratification before entry into force of the Protocol to the BTWC is more complex.    In an
ideal world, the three states having, as it were, led the way through being Depositaries of the
                                                
10Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Chronological list, Available on http://www.opcw.nl/memsta/ratifyer.htm
7BTWC could be expected to be amongst the first to ratify the Protocol as they would be
amongst the principal protagonists of the effective strengthening of the BTWC and thus
favour the early entry into force of the Protocol -- and, consequently, there would be no
necessity to require them specifically to deposit their instruments of ratification before entry
into force of the Protocol.
18.   However, in practice, the situation is not as straightforward.   The record of the past
decade has not shown all three states taking the lead in ratifying arms control conventions and
treaties.   Although the UK record has been reasonable -- the UK was the 51st to ratify the
CWC on 13 May 1996, ratified the CTBT on 6 April 1998 and ratified the Anti-Personnel
Mines Convention on 31 July 1998 -- the same cannot be said for the other two states.  The
US was the 80th to ratify the CWC on 25 April 1997 -- four days before it entered into force -
- and has yet to ratify the CTBT and has not signed or ratified the Anti-Personnel Mines
Convention. Russia was the 104th to ratify the CWC on 5 November 1997 and has yet to
ratify the CTBT and has not signed or ratified the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention.
19.   In considering whether or not the requirements for entry into force should include the
deposit of instruments of ratification by the Depositaries, it is noted that there are six treaties
which all date from the 1960s and the early 1970s with the triple-depositary mechanism
which require deposit of instruments of ratification by the Depositaries of which the BTWC
was the last.   In chronological order these are:
Year Treaty Article Entry into Force Requirement
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty11
III.3
'after ratification by all the Original Parties' -
-the US, UK and Soviet Union.
1967 Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space12 XIV.3
'five Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary
Governments'
1968 Rescue and Return of
Astronauts and Objects13 7.3
'five Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary
Governments'
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
 Treaty14 IX.3
'the Governments which are designated
Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other
States'
                                                
11Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.   Known as the
Limited Test Ban Treaty or the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/itbt1.htm#2
12Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.  Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/ space1. htm
13Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH523.txt
14United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty Series, Vol. 729, I. No. 10485,
168-175, 1970.
8Year Treaty Article Entry into Force Requirement
1971 Sea-Bed Treaty15
X.3
'twenty-two Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary
Governments of this Treaty.'
1972 Biological and Toxin
 Weapons Convention16 XIV.3
'twenty-two Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositaries of
the Convention.'
On entry into force specifically, of the six treaties with the triple-depositary requirement, all
require their ratification prior to entry into force by  all three Depositaries, but only the first,
the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, makes that the only condition for entry into force.
20.  It is noteworthy that other contemporaneous treaties have the UN Secretary-General as
the Depositary or, if they have the US, UK and the Soviet Union as Depositaries, do not
require the deposit of instruments of ratification by the Depositaries.
Year Treaty Depositary Article Entry into Force Requirement
1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations17
UN S-G
51.1
'the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of the twenty-second
instrument'
1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations18
UN S-G
77.1
'the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of the twenty-second
instrument'
1966 Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination19
UN S-G
19.1
'the thirtieth day after the date of
deposit...of the twenty-seventh
instrument'
1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties20
UN S-G
84.1
'the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of the thirty-fifth
instrument'
1970 Patent Cooperation
Treaty21
Director-
General of
IPCU
63.1
'three months after eight States have
deposited their instruments'
                                                
15Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.   Available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/
seabed1.htm
16United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, General Assembly Resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
17Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH408.txt
18Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol.   Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH444.txt
19International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  Available at http:// www.
tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH490.txt
20Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/
texts/BH538.txt
21Patent Cooperation Treaty.  Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH562.txt
9Year Treaty Depositary Article Entry into Force Requirement
1970 Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft22
UK,  US and
Soviet Union
13.3 'thirty days following the date of
deposit...by ten States'
1971 Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation23
UK,  US and
Soviet Union 15.3
'thirty days following the date of
deposit...by ten States'
1972 International Liability for
Damage caused by Space
Objects24
UK,  US and
Soviet Union XXIV.3
'the deposit of the fifth instrument
of ratification'
1975 Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer
Space25
UN S-G
VIII.3
'the deposit of the fifth such
instrument'
1977 Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental
Modification Techniques26
UN S-G
IX.3
'the deposit of instruments of
ratification by twenty Governments'
21.  As pointed out in our Evaluation Paper on Article XXII Depositary/ies 27, the use of the
triple-depositary mechanism in nine treaties, of which the BTWC was the last, can be seen as
a temporary device limited to alleviating the adverse impact of East-West problems on
participation in multilateral treaties.  It was designed to get round problems of non-
recognition or absence of diplomatic relations by offering a choice among the three
Depositary Governments with which to deposit instruments of ratification and accession.   It
lost much of its usefulness once the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic were admitted simultaneously to membership of the United Nations in
1973, and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975, with corresponding
extension of recognition and diplomatic relations.   Although the German case is only one of
several which the triple-depositary mechanism was designed to address, it is evident that no
treaty has chosen to make use of that mechanism since the BTWC in 1972.
 22.   It is also of particular interest that, although the 1967 Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Treaty requires the deposit of instruments of ratification by the three Depositaries for entry
into force, the two subsequent associated Conventions -- the 1972 International Liability for
Damage caused by Space Objects Convention and the 1975 Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space Convention -- do not, with the former having the triple-depositary
                                                
22Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, The Netherlands, 16 December
1970.
23Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.  Available at http://
www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH586.txt
24Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects.  Available at http://www.tufts.
edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH595.txt
25Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.   Available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH653.txt
26Convention on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
Available at http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/ texts/BH700.txt
27Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXII:  Depositary/ies, Evaluation Paper No. 7, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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mechanism and the latter having the UN Secretary-General as Depositary.   There is a clear
transition during the 1960s and 1970s away from the triple-depositary mechanism and from
the requirement for prior deposit of instruments by the three states to a system in which the
UN Secretary-General is the Depositary and  deposit by a varying number of States is
required for entry into force.   This same trend is also shown by the much more recent 1996
CTBT, which can be regarded as a successor to the LTBT, and which has the Secretary-
General of the UN as the Depositary as do the CWC and the Anti-Personnel Mines
Convention.
23.   It is worth noting that the different approach adopted by the CTBT28 in which the
requirement
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case
earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
is for the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty to have deposited their instruments of
ratification is not a viable option for the BTWC Protocol on at least three grounds.   First of
all, if an analogous approach were to be taken which States should be selected as being
required to deposit their instruments of ratification prior to entry into force?   Given that the
capabilities for production of microorganisms are so widespread -- there is no microbiological
parallel to the IAEA tables of nuclear power reactors and nuclear research reactors -- there
would be no logic and it would be highly invidious in selecting some States and neglecting
others.   Secondly, such a list-based approach would enable any of the selected States to
effectively hold all the other States Parties to ransom by refusing to deposit its instrument of
ratification until its requests, whatever these were, were met.   Finally, such an approach
would be contrary to the objective of achieving the rapid entry into force of the Protocol
given that the BTWC is already in force and urgently needs to be strengthened.
Consequently, an analogous approach to that for entry into force of the CTBT would be
inappropriate, invidious and highly inefficient for the entry into force of the BTWC Protocol.
24.   As the CWC is the arms control treaty of closest relevance to the BTWC, it is useful to
consider its requirements for entry into force more closely.   Even though it was well known
internationally that the two largest possessors of chemical weapons were the United States
and the Russian Federation, there was no requirement that these two largest possessor States
should ratify the CWC prior to its entry into force.  Indeed, the US ratified four days before
entry into force and the Russian Federation some six months after entry into force.
25.  The situation regarding the ratification of the CWC by the United States is further
exacerbated because the US Senate in its advice and consent to the ratification of the CWC
imposed a number of conditions which were binding on the US President.   Although these
are discussed further in our Evaluation Paper on Article XXI Reservations 29, the principal
points are noted here.    In essence, although Article XXII of the CWC states that the Articles
                                                
28Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.   Available at http://www.ctbto.org/ctbto/pdf/cbten.pdf
29Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Article XXI:  Reservations, Evaluation Paper No. 6, University of
Bradford, September 1999. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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of this Convention shall not be subject to reservation, the US Senate stated30 that it reserved
the right , pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to give its advice and consent to
ratification of the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the
Convention.   One of the conditions imposed by the US Senate is regarded by the OPCW as a
substantial problem31; this is Condition (18) which reads as follows:
(18) LABORATORY SAMPLE ANALYSIS - Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that no sample
collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for
analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.
The subsequent Presidential certification32 states that In connection with Condition (18),
Laboratory Sample Analysis, no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the
Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.   This was then carried forward into a statement33 made upon ratification by the
United States which stated that:
"....[the] ratification of the Convention, with Annexes,  [is] subject to the condition
which relates to the Annexe on Implementation and Verification, that no sample
collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for
analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States"
This is a damaging condition as one of the key requirements for ensuring that the CWC is a
strong Convention is to ensure that any samples resulting from a challenge inspection shall be
independently analysed in two internationally accredited laboratories with the possibility of
analysis in a third internationally accredited laboratory should there be disagreement between
the results from the first two laboratories.   It is also a surprising US condition given the past
history of divergent analytical results of samples arising in respect of the alleged use of
trichothecene mycotoxins in South East Asia.  Indeed the past history of the investigation of
alleged uses of chemical weapons has repeatedly demonstrated the vital importance of
independent analysis blind using validated analytical methods in internationally accredited
laboratories.
26.   Another qualification which is contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the CWC was
imposed in the US legislation to implement the CWC and was again highlighted by the CWC
as a substantial problem34:  this is Section 307 of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act35 which states:
                                                
30United States Senate, Executive Resolution 75, Chemical Weapons Convention, 24 April 1997.   Available on
the web at http://www.stimson.org/cwc/s-75.htm
31Arms Control Today, The CWC at the Two-Year Mark: An Interview with Dr John Gee, Arms Control Today,
April/May 1999, pp.3-9.
32The White House, To the Congress of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 April 1997.
Available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/4/28/11.text.1
33Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW:  The Legal Texts, ed. Lisa Woollomes
Tabassi, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 1999, p. 114.
34Arms Control Today, The CWC at the Two-Year Mark: An Interview with Dr John Gee, Arms Control Today,
April/May 1999, pp. 3-9.
35United States Congress, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999.,
Public Law 105-277, 21 October 1998.  The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998  is on
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SEC. 307.  NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION.
Consistent with the objective of eliminating chemical weapons, the President may
deny a request to inspect any facility in the United States in cases where the President
determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the national security interests of
the United States.
CWC Article IX  Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding  is quite clear that there is no
right of refusal.   Its section headed Procedures for challenge inspections  states that:
11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and
in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the
inspected State Party shall have:
(a)The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate
its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection
team to fulfil its mandate;
(b)The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole
purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
compliance; and
(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this
Convention.
and makes it clear that States Parties are obliged to provide access.
27.   This unsatisfactory situation regarding the US ratification of the CWC is one that should
be guarded against, to the maximum possible extent, in finalizing the language of the
Protocol to the BTWC.   The objective of a strong and effective Protocol will best be served
by a Protocol that is ratified rapidly by all States Parties, including the three Depositaries of
the BTWC.
28.   Assessment.  Against this background, it is concluded that there is a strong argument for
not requiring the three Depositaries of the BTWC to have deposited their instruments of
ratification of the Protocol prior to its entry into force.   The three should be encouraged to be
founder States Parties to the Protocol but there should be no requirement for this.  Equally,
there is a compelling argument against a CTBT type list-based requirement for selected States
to have deposited their instruments of ratification prior to entry into force.
Strike-through text for Article XX
29.  Our view is that Article XX should be based on the first option -- ie the Secretary-
General of the United Nations as the Depositary -- and that the number of instruments to be
deposited should be reduced to 20 in order to achieve an entry into force and the bringing of
                                                                                                                                                       
pages 856-887.   Public Law 105-277 is available on the web at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/
publaw/105publ.html
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the new Organization into operation with its full authority two years after opening for
signature.   Consequently, the text should be amended and the remaining square brackets
removed as shown in a strike-through text version of Article XX below so as to produce clean
text:
ARTICLE XX
ENTRY INTO FORCE
[[ 1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the
20th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than two years after its opening for
signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent
to the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the 30th day
following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.]
